The Soviet-Led Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968

On the night of 20–21 August 1968 Warsaw Pact forces entered Czechoslovakia and ended the Prague Spring. Four weeks earlier the National Security Adviser had told the President that the Soviets would not move militarily; on the evening of the invasion the Secretary of State said "This surprises me." Three months later the CIA's own post-mortem recorded that at no point had the intelligence community judged an invasion more likely than not. The record of how that judgement was formed, dissented from, and overruled is unusually complete.

32 documents 6 claims 1968-04-24 → 1968-11-07

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Chronology

• 1968-04-24 — NSC judges intervention unlikely
  Bohlen reasons from the Romanian precedent: Moscow will be reluctant to intervene directly.
• 1968-05-10 — State proposes a deterrent signal — and is overruled
  Eugene Rostow: the moment to signal is now. Katzenbach and Rusk reject it in writing.
• 1968-07-24 — The Tuesday lunch: "The Soviets will not move militarily"
  The National Security Adviser states the judgement at the President's table, with the DCI present.
• 1968-07-26 — Bohlen dissents in writing
  "I find the military preparations somewhat excessive for a war of nerves."
• 1968-08-04 — Čierna and Bratislava produce relief
  Embassy Prague reports Dubček "stared down the Soviet threat of force".
• 1968-08-10 — DCI: "Czechoslovakia is eased, not over"
  Eleven days before the invasion, briefing Nixon and Agnew at the LBJ Ranch.
• 1968-08-20 — Warsaw Pact forces enter Czechoslovakia
  Dobrynin notifies Johnson at 20:15; the emergency NSC meets at 22:15.
• 1968-08-22 — Rusk names the error to the Cabinet
  "The political costs the Soviets would have to pay was one reason we thought they would not move."
• 1968-11-07 — NIE 12-68 explains the invasion
  The community's retrospective estimate: genuine fear for a reliable Communist authority in Prague.
• 1968-11-22 — CIA post-mortem on the Czech crisis
  "At no time was the intelligence community able to make a judgment that a Soviet invasion was more likely than not."

Claims under test

• Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia was becoming likely during the summer of 1968. — 3 supporting, 4 contradicting (contested)
• The United States observed indicators of Soviet military preparation and read them as pressure rather than preparation. — 4 supporting, 0 contradicting (corroborated)
• Western analysis assumed Moscow would be deterred by the political costs of invading. — 2 supporting, 0 contradicting (corroborated)
• Soviet denial and deception materially shaped the Western assessment. — 1 supporting, 1 contradicting (contested)
• The "request" for intervention from Czechoslovak officials was a pretext rather than an act of the Czechoslovak government. — 2 supporting, 0 contradicting (corroborated)
• The Soviet decision to invade was taken late, leaving little to detect in advance. — 2 supporting, 2 contradicting (contested)

Documents in this case (32)

• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D20 — Memorandum for the Record: NSC meeting on Eastern Europe (NSC, 1968-04-24)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D60 — Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to Secretary Rusk (Department of State, 1968-05-10)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D62 — Telegram 162669 From the Department of State to the Mission to NATO (Department of State, 1968-05-11)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D65 — Telegram 4614 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State (Embassy Moscow, 1968-07-11)
• WILSON-SHELEST-1968-07-18 — Report to the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee on the situation in Czechoslovakia (Communist Party of Ukraine, 1968-07-18)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D67 — Memorandum From Under Secretary Rostow to Secretary Rusk (Department of State, 1968-07-20)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D69 — Telegram 4751 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State (Embassy Moscow, 1968-07-22)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D72 — Notes of Meeting (the Tuesday lunch) (White House / NSC, 1968-07-24)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D73 — Memorandum From Charles Bohlen to Secretary Rusk (Department of State, 1968-07-26)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D74 — Transcript of Meeting: President Johnson, Senator Dirksen and Secretary Rusk (White House, 1968-07-27)
• WILSON-LETTER-OF-INVITATION — Letter from Czech Communist politicians to Brezhnev requesting Soviet intervention (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (anti-reformist faction), 1968-08-01)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D76 — Telegram 4910 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union: "Czechoslovakia-Soviet relations: the long range view" (Embassy Moscow, 1968-08-02)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D77 — Telegram 2825 From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State (Embassy Prague, 1968-08-04)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D78 — Notes of Meeting at the LBJ Ranch (briefing of Nixon and Agnew) (White House / CIA, 1968-08-10)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D79 — Memorandum of Conversation: Eugene Rostow and Ambassador Dobrynin aboard the Honey Fitz (Department of State, 1968-08-19)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D80 — Summary of Meeting: President Johnson and Ambassador Dobrynin (White House, 1968-08-20)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D81 — Notes of Emergency Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC, 1968-08-20)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D82 — Telegram 224693 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia (Department of State, 1968-08-21)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D83 — Telegram 5178 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union: "Invasion of Czechoslovakia" (Embassy Moscow, 1968-08-21)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D84 — Notes of Cabinet Meeting (White House, 1968-08-22)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D85 — Summary of Meeting, Cabinet Room (White House, 1968-08-23)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D89 — Memorandum of Conversation: Thompson and Dobrynin (Department of State, 1968-08-27)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D93 — Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC, 1968-09-04)
• IMSWM-254-68 — Military Analysis and Assessment of the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia (NATO International Military Staff, 1968-09-12)
• SNIE 11-17-68 — Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-17-68: "Capabilities of the Warsaw Pact Against NATO" (CIA / INR / DIA / NSA, 1968-10-08)
• C-R(68)52-ANNEX — North Atlantic Council record: follow-up to the report on the political implications of the Czechoslovak crisis (C-M(68)43 REV) (North Atlantic Council, 1968-10-17, metadata only)
• FRUS 1964-68 v17 D26 — National Intelligence Estimate NIE 12-68: "Eastern Europe and the USSR in the Aftermath of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia" (CIA / USIB (interagency), 1968-11-07)
• CIA-RDP80B01495R001300130019-7 — Post Mortem on Czech Crisis — Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA / Intelligence Community Staff, 1968-11-22)
• CIA-CSI-GRABO-14-1 — Cynthia M. Grabo, "Soviet Deception in the Czechoslovak Crisis", Studies in Intelligence Vol. 14 No. 1 (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1970-01-01)
• NSARCHIVE-PRAGUE-SPRING-68 — The Prague Spring '68 — web companion to the CEU Press / National Security Archive Cold War Reader (National Security Archive, 1998-09-01, metadata only)
• NSA-CRYPTOLOGIC-ALMANAC-SPRING-2 — From Spring, into a Long Winter's Night: The Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1968, Part Two (National Security Agency, 2003-02-28)
• CIA-STRATEGIC-WARNING-1968 — The CIA and Strategic Warning: The 1968 Soviet-Led Invasion of Czechoslovakia (CIA (historical study), 2009-09-01)