ABD, Yunanistan'ın Makarios'a karşı hamlesi konusunda yeterli önceden uyarıya sahipti.
contestedconfidence: moderate
The official post-mortem denies "warning" in its headline and affirms "ample intelligence" in its attachment — the contradiction is internal to a single document.
Destekleyen ve teyit eden deliller
The Greek Government attempts to subvert the GOC and remove Makarios from office or closely control his activities. This development occurs without the knowledge of the Turkish Government whose reaction remains unpredictable.
FRUS 1969-76 v30 D75, State / NSC Interdepartmental Group (NEA), 1974-05-06 · source ↗
From various reports, it is evident that Ioannides is seriously considering way to topple Makarios from power, a move which could have disastrous consequences for US interests in Eastern Mediterranean as well as for peoples of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. In our view effort to remove Makarios by force contains unacceptable risks of generating chaos eventually causing Greco-Turk confrontation.
FRUS 1969-76 v30 D77, Department of State, 1974-06-29 · source ↗
As the record shows, there was ample intelligence prior to the July 15 coup of the heightening tension developing between the Greek and Cypriot governments. Although much of it was conflicting, and even intentionally misleading, the weight of evidence pointed to an impending direct move against Makarios by Ioannides.
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10 · source ↗
Çelişen deliller
One cannot conclude from the attached survey that we had what could be called 'warning' of an impending coup. What we did have were sufficient storm signals to warrant some diplomatic action—which, in retrospect, seems to have been weak and indecisive.
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10 · source ↗
[less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] stated on July 3 that Ioannides had decided, for the time being, against action to remove Makarios because of —the uncertainty of Soviet reaction and —fear that Turkey might misinterpret the move.
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10 · source ↗
a moderate line while playing for time
CIA-RDP94T00754R000100230009-7, CIA (Directorate of Intelligence records), 1975-10-03 · source ↗
Bağlam
It may be relevant to point out that during the months of spring and early summer our attention was fixed on the Aegean dispute as the arena that would most readily ignite into Greek-Turkish hostilities. Although we felt that Cyprus would inevitably be dragged into such a conflict, we were less certain that Cyprus would be the flash point.
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10 · source ↗
Four events were chosen for hearings: the 1973 Mid-East war, the 1974 Cyprus coup, the 1974 Portuguese coup, and the 1968 TET offensive in Vietnam.
PIKE-1975-CYPRUS, US House Select Committee on Intelligence, 1976-02-16 · source ↗