Memorandum From INR Director Hyland to Secretary Kissinger: "Cyprus Coup Post Mortem", with attached chronology
INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) FRUS inr_memo Secret; Nodis
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Verbatim passages
Ioannides may well have read into the US warnings that reached him primary concern over intercommunal violence. (According to a CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] [TDFIBDB–315/06765–74], when asked immediately after the coup about foreign reaction, Ioannides replied, 'the Americans are okay.')
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10
It may be relevant to point out that during the months of spring and early summer our attention was fixed on the Aegean dispute as the arena that would most readily ignite into Greek-Turkish hostilities. Although we felt that Cyprus would inevitably be dragged into such a conflict, we were less certain that Cyprus would be the flash point.
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10 · The collection-priorities admission
[less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] stated on July 3 that Ioannides had decided, for the time being, against action to remove Makarios because of —the uncertainty of Soviet reaction and —fear that Turkey might misinterpret the move.
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10 · The 3 July single-source report that reversed the judgement
In its NID of June 29 the CIA noted that Ioannides had speculated the previous week on the possibility of removing Makarios and entering into an 'all-encompassing' agreement with Ankara, but that he considered such a move dangerous and was unlikely to attempt it soon unless Makarios pressed the NG issue too far.
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10 · Quoting the CIA National Intelligence Daily of 29 June 1974
As the record shows, there was ample intelligence prior to the July 15 coup of the heightening tension developing between the Greek and Cypriot governments. Although much of it was conflicting, and even intentionally misleading, the weight of evidence pointed to an impending direct move against Makarios by Ioannides.
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10 · Attachment, closing assessment — in tension with the memorandum's own headline
One cannot conclude from the attached survey that we had what could be called 'warning' of an impending coup. What we did have were sufficient storm signals to warrant some diplomatic action—which, in retrospect, seems to have been weak and indecisive.
William Hyland (INR) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148, INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 1974-09-10 · The headline conclusion of the official US post-mortem
Document metadata
| Reference | FRUS 1969-76 v30 D148 |
|---|---|
| Originating body | INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) — William Hyland |
| Date | 1974-09-10 |
| Document type | inr_memo |
| Classification | Secret; Nodis |
| Archive | Foreign Relations of the United States — Office of the Historian (US) |
| Provenance | The single most important document on what the US knew in advance. Two paragraphs not declassified. |
Claims this document bears on
The United States had adequate advance warning of the Greek move against Makarios.
Collection priorities were pointed at the Aegean, not Cyprus.
The United States had adequate advance warning of the Greek move against Makarios.
A single-source report of 3 July reversed the judgement.
The United States had adequate advance warning of the Greek move against Makarios.
The attachment to the same memorandum reaches the opposite emphasis. This is the clearest internal contradiction in the corpus.
The United States had adequate advance warning of the Greek move against Makarios.
The official post-mortem's headline finding.
Assessments recorded from this document
- INR — certain (1974-09-10) · "the weight of evidence pointed to"
- CIA — low (1974-07-03) · "had decided, for the time being, against"
Information provenance
- same_underlying_source (inferred) → FRUS 1969-76 v30 D14 — Both rest on reporting of Ioannides's own statements; the post-mortem quotes CIA HUMINT of 29 May, the telegram relays a message to Tasca.
- summarizes (documented) → FRUS 1969-76 v30 D77 — The INR post-mortem chronology reviews the 29 June State telegram as part of the record.
Entities
Archbishop Makarios IIIBrig. Gen. Dimitrios IoannidesWilliam HylandBureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)TurkeyGreeceCyprus