Turkey was increasingly likely to intervene militarily in Cyprus.
contestedconfidence: moderate
Supported by embassy reporting from 15 July and by Turkish statements from 17 July; contradicted by the community's own 21 June judgement and by two WSAG principals as late as 17 July.
Supporting and corroborating evidence
Turkish policy on the Cyprus coup is still evolving. Yet two judgments which will be important as USG moves to prevent spread of conflict and protect its own interests can now be suggested with some confidence: (A) GOT will move strongly, directly, and unitedly to prevent enosis by all means, including use of force, when and if it is convinced enosis is imminent. This is not only nationalist and emotional reaction but part of accepted Turkish grand strategy.
Ambassador Macomber — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D85, Embassy Ankara, 1974-07-15 · source ↗
Oh, I think they'll try to avoid having to move. I didn't mean to say that we think they'll move. I think they'll try the diplomatic route first, but may feel in the end that they have to move in.
William Colby (DCI) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D91, NSC / WSAG, 1974-07-17 · source ↗
Current situation therefore completely unacceptable to the GOT. If acceptable situation not recreated, Turkey will have to directly intervene with military force on island.
Bülent Ecevit (as reported by Macomber) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D90, Embassy Ankara, 1974-07-17 · source ↗
He believed, however, that even this process would not likely be enough to stay Ankara's hand.
FRUS 1969-76 v30 D96, Department of State, 1974-07-18 · source ↗
Finally, I have the distinct impression that no matter what is done in this situation, the Turks see it as an ideal time to achieve by military intervention a longstanding objective, namely, double enosis.
Joseph Sisco — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D99, Department of State (Sisco, reporting from Athens), 1974-07-19 · source ↗
My feeling is that the Turks at this stage are not going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island.
James Schlesinger (Secretary of Defense) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D100, Department of Defense / NSC, 1974-07-19 · source ↗
The Greeks and the Greek Cypriots would almost certainly oppose the Turks but we have no doubt that the latter would succeed in attaining their objectives.
UK Joint Intelligence Committee, assessment of 19 July 1974 — GREESE-42, LSE Hellenic Observatory (quoting UK JIC and Cabinet files), 2010-12-01 · source ↗
Contradicting evidence
It is within Turkey's capabilities to cut off Cyprus from any Greek access, and to launch a successful landing on the island, if it chooses. Ankara would take such action only in the unlikely event of a Greek attempt to take over the island or in order to protect a threatened Turkish minority on the island.
FRUS 1969-76 v30 D15, CIA / DIA / INR (Interagency), 1974-06-21 · source ↗
GOT has little desire get involved in favor of one side or the other. Its basic interest in Cyprus rests on concern for Turkish community there and unwillingness for strategic reasons see unrestricted or unchallenged Greek control of island (e.g., enosis).
Ambassador Macomber — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D76, Embassy Ankara, 1974-06-25 · source ↗
I just can't believe that. I just can't believe they want Makarios back in power.
Henry Kissinger — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D86, NSC / WSAG, 1974-07-16 · source ↗
Well, Henry, I agree with Bill's assessment. But I don't really know why. I don't think the Turks will move in (on Cyprus). They may make some noise, but I don't think they'll move.
William Clements (Deputy Secretary of Defense) — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D91, NSC / WSAG, 1974-07-17 · source ↗
Context
There are two possibilities on the Turkish side: (a) If any fighting associated with the coup begins to spill over into the Turk Cypriot community and seriously threatens it, Turkey may move to fulfill its promise of immediate military assistance and all the implications that such a move would have for a broader Turkish-Greek confrontation. (b) If the Turk Cypriot community remains relatively unaffected and its needs met by the new government, Ankara may well acquiesce in these developments.
Rosemary Niehuss — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D79, NSC Staff, 1974-07-15 · source ↗
Sisco met during the early morning of July 20 with Ecevit. It was clear that Turks had already taken decision to intervene militarily and Ecevit refused to budge.
FRUS 1969-76 v30 D104, Department of State, 1974-07-20 · source ↗