Briefing Memorandum From Assistant Secretary Hartman to Secretary Kissinger, with attached paper "Cyprus: Issues and Options"
Department of State / INR FRUS briefing Secret
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Verbatim passages
Double enosis is the more likely: it is a long-standing Turkish goal; once on Cyprus in force the mainland Turks are unlikely to withdraw and permit any other solution.
FRUS 1969-76 v30 D112, Department of State / INR, 1974-07-22 · Attachment, Section II — State/INR, same day as the CIA judgement that partition was not achievable
If the Turks insist on continuing the fighting to consolidate their position, the Greeks will probably attack Turkey across the Evros River in Thrace. In that case the Turks would probably respond with action against Greek Aegean islands.
FRUS 1969-76 v30 D112, Department of State / INR, 1974-07-22 · Attachment, Section I
Document metadata
| Reference | FRUS 1969-76 v30 D112 |
|---|---|
| Originating body | Department of State / INR — Attachment drafted by Thomas Simons (S/P) and Philip Stoddard (INR) |
| Date | 1974-07-22 |
| Document type | briefing |
| Classification | Secret |
| Archive | Foreign Relations of the United States — Office of the Historian (US) |
| Provenance | Interagency group incl. OSD/ISA, JCS, CIA, NSC, S/P |
Claims this document bears on
State/INR reach the same conclusion in writing.
After the first operation Turkey lacked the territory needed to establish a defensible partition.
State/INR, the same day, judge the opposite.
Greece would not go to war with Turkey over Cyprus.
State judged a Greek attack across the Evros probable.
Assessments recorded from this document
- Department of State / INR — high (1974-07-22) · "the more likely" / "unlikely to withdraw"
Entities
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)US Department of StateTurkeyGreeceCyprusEnosis (union of Cyprus with Greece)Double enosis / de facto partition