Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger
White House / NSC FRUS telcon No classification marking
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Verbatim passages
There was no way we could have saved Makarios—the question was could we have brought him back faster.
Henry Kissinger — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D103, White House / NSC, 1974-07-19
…and so the Turks did what they have been wanting to do for 15 years—establish a predominant position on Cyprus.
Henry Kissinger — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D103, White House / NSC, 1974-07-19
But let's see how the Greeks react, Mr. President. There is still a 10% chance that this thing will be settled by Monday.
Henry Kissinger — FRUS 1969-76 v30 D103, White House / NSC, 1974-07-19 · An explicit numerical probability — rare in the record
Document metadata
| Reference | FRUS 1969-76 v30 D103 |
|---|---|
| Originating body | White House / NSC — Nixon, Kissinger |
| Date | 1974-07-19 22:06 PDT |
| Document type | telcon |
| Classification | No classification marking |
| Archive | Foreign Relations of the United States — Office of the Historian (US) |
| Provenance | Contains an explicit numerical probability |
Information provenance
- derived_from (inferred) → FRUS 1969-76 v30 D102 — Kissinger spoke to DCI Colby at 21:35 and to the President at 22:06 the same evening. Treating the two telcons as independent confirmation of the same reporting would double-count a single origin.
Entities
Archbishop Makarios IIIHenry KissingerNational Security Council / WSAGTurkeyGreeceCyprus